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(I)
QUESTION PRESENTED
Beginning in 2014, the minimum coverage provision
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Af-
fordable Care Act), will require non-exempted individu-
als to maintain a minimum level of health insurance or
pay a tax penalty.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124
Stat. 244-249 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. 5000A).  Con-
stitutional challenges to the provision are now pending
in four courts of appeals, three of which have expedited
proceedings—including in this very case.  The question
presented is whether the Court should grant certiorari
before judgment in the court of appeals to decide:
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that
petitioner could establish standing to challenge the mini-
mum coverage provision by enacting a law that declares
that no Virginia resident “shall be required to obtain or
maintain” an individual insurance policy.  Va. Code Ann.
§ 38.2-3430.1:1 (Supp. 2010).
2. Whether the district court erred in holding that
the minimum coverage provision is not a valid exercise
of Congress’s Article I powers.
3. Whether the district court erred in holding that
the minimum coverage provision is severable from other
provisions of the Affordable Care Act.
4. Whether the district court erred in denying an
injunction.
(III)
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In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 10-1014
VIRGINIA, EX REL. KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, PETITIONER
v.
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
BEFORE JUDGMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the district court denying respon-
dent’s motion to dismiss (Pet. App. 54-89) is reported at
702 F. Supp. 2d 598.  The opinion of the district court
granting summary judgment for petitioner in part (Pet.
App. 1-53) is reported at 728 F. Supp. 2d 768.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the district court was entered on
December 13, 2010.  Respondent filed a notice of appeal
on January 18, 2011.  Petitioner also filed a notice of ap-
peal on January 18, 2011.  The petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari before judgment was filed on February 8, 2011.
2This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1) and 2101(e).
STATEMENT
The Virginia General Assembly enacted a statute de-
claring that its residents do not have to comply with a
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (Affordable Care Act or Act), Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119, requiring non-exempted individuals to
maintain a minimum level of health insurance or pay a
tax penalty.  Petitioner then used its state statute to sue
respondent in an effort to secure a declaration that its
state statute is valid because the federal minimum cov-
erage provision falls outside Congress’s enumerated
powers under Article I of the Constitution.  The district
court found that petitioner had standing and granted
petitioner summary judgment on its constitutional claim.
Both parties appealed, and, on a joint motion by respon-
dent and petitioner, the court of appeals expedited brief-
ing in the case and will hear oral argument on May 10.
Petitioner nonetheless seeks to bypass that process of
orderly appellate review by asking this Court to grant
certiorari before judgment.  The petition for a writ of
certiorari before judgment should be denied.
1. Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act to
ameliorate the longstanding crisis in the interstate mar-
ket for health care services, which accounts for more
than 17% of the Nation’s gross domestic product.
Among other problems, millions of people without health
insurance consume health care services for which they
do not fully pay.  These uncompensated costs—totaling
$43 billion in 2008—are shifted to health care providers
in the interstate health care market.  Providers pass on
much of this cost to private health insurance companies,
31 See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., At Risk:  Pre-Existing
Conditions Could Affect 1 in 2 Americans, HealthCare.gov (2011),
http://www.healthcare.gov/center/reports/preexisting.html.
which also operate interstate.  The result is higher pre-
miums, which, in turn, make insurance unaffordable to
even more people.  See generally Act §§ 1501(a) and
(a)(2), 10106(a), 124 Stat. 242, 243, 907 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. 18091(a) and (a)(2)) (congressional findings).
At the same time, insurance companies use restrictive
underwriting practices to deny coverage or charge unaf-
fordable premiums to millions of people because they
have pre-existing medical conditions.1 
a. The Affordable Care Act includes several mea-
sures designed to make affordable, comprehensive
health insurance coverage widely available, protect con-
sumers from restrictive insurance underwriting prac-
tices, and reduce the uncompensated costs of medical
care obtained by the uninsured, which are borne by oth-
ers in the health care market.
First, the Act builds upon the existing nationwide
system of employer-based health insurance that is the
principal private mechanism for health care financing.
The Act establishes tax incentives for small businesses
to purchase health insurance for their employees,
§§ 1421(a), 10105(e), 124 Stat. 237, 906 (to be codified at
26 U.S.C. 45R), and, under certain circumstances, pre-
scribes tax penalties starting in 2014 for large employ-
ers that do not offer full-time employees adequate cover-
age.  §§ 1513(a), 10106(e) and (f ), 10108(i)(1)(A), 124
Stat. 253, 910, 914; Health Care and Education Reconcil-
iation Act of 2010 (Reconciliation Act), Pub. L. No. 111-
152, § 1003, 124 Stat. 1033 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.
4980H). 
4Second, the Act provides for the creation of health
insurance exchanges to allow individuals, families, and
small businesses to use the leverage of collective buying
power to obtain prices that are competitive with those
of large-employer group plans.  §§ 1311, 10104(e)-(h),
10203(a), 124 Stat. 173, 900-901, 927 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. 18031).
Third, for individuals and families with household
income between 133% and 400% of the federal poverty
level who purchase health insurance coverage through
an exchange, the Act establishes federal tax credits
that can offset all or part of payments for the insurance
premiums.  §§ 1401(a), 10105(a)-(c), 10108(h)(1), 124
Stat. 213, 906, 914; Reconciliation Act §§ 1001(a),
1004(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 1030, 1034 (to be
codified at 26 U.S.C. 36B).  In addition, Congress ex-
panded eligibility for Medicaid to cover individuals with
income below 133% of the federal poverty level.
§ 2001(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. 271 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)).  The Act provides that the fed-
eral government will pay for 100% of the expenditures
required to cover recipients made newly eligible under
the Act through 2016, gradually declining to 90% in 2020
and beyond—far above the usual federal matching rates
under Medicaid.  § 2001(a)(3)(B), 124 Stat. 272; Recon-
ciliation Act, § 1201(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1051 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. 1396d(y)(1)).
Fourth, the Act imposes new regulations on insur-
ance companies to protect individuals from industry
practices that have prevented people from obtaining and
keeping health insurance.  The Act bars insurance com-
panies from refusing to cover individuals because of a
pre-existing medical condition, § 1201(4), 124 Stat. 155
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a)), can-
52 This insurance requirement may be satisfied through enrollment
in an employer-sponsored insurance plan, an individual market plan in-
cluding a plan offered through a new health insurance exchange, a
grandfathered health plan, certain government-sponsored programs
such as Medicare, Medicaid, or TRICARE, or similar coverage recog-
nized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in coordination
with the Secretary of the Treasury.  Act § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 248 (to be
codified at 26 U.S.C. 5000A(f )).
celing insurance absent fraud or intentional misrepre-
sentation of material fact, § 1001(5), 124 Stat. 131 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-12), charging higher premi-
ums based on a person’s medical history, § 1201(3), 124
Stat. 154 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 300gg), and placing
lifetime dollar caps on the benefits of a policyholder for
which the insurer will pay, §§ 1001(5), 10101(a), 124 Stat.
130, 883 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 300gg-11).
Finally, the Act amends the Internal Revenue Code
to provide that, starting in 2014, a non-exempted indi-
vidual who fails to maintain a minimum level of health
insurance must pay a tax penalty.  § 1501(b), 124 Stat.
244-249 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. 5000A).2  Under this
minimum coverage provision, individuals who are not
required to file income tax returns for a given year are
not required to pay the penalty.  § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 247;
Reconciliation Act, § 1002(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1032 (to be
codified at 26 U.S.C. 5000A(e)(2)).  The amount of any
penalty is calculated in part by reference to household
income for federal income tax purposes; it is reported on
the individual’s federal income tax return for the taxable
year;  and it is assessed and collected in the same man-
ner as certain other federal tax penalties.  §§ 1501(b),
10106(b)(2), 124 Stat. 244-245, 249, 909; Reconciliation
Act, § 1002(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1032 (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. 5000A(b)(2), (c)(1), (c)(2) and (g)).
63 For example, the average cost of an appendectomy in 2010 was
$13,123.  International Fed’n of Health Plans,  2010 Comparative Price
Report:  Medical and Hospital Fees By Country, 14, http://www.ifhp.
com/documents/IFHPpricereport151210.pdf.  The average cost of a day
in the hospital was $3,612; of a hospital stay, $14,427; of a Caesarian-
section, $13,016; of bypass surgery, $59,770; of an angioplasty, $29,055.
Id. at 9, 10, 12, 16, 17.  Drug treatment for a common form of cancer
costs more than $150,000 a year.  Neal J. Meropol et al., Cost of Cancer
Care:  Issues and Implications, 25 J. Clin. Oncol. 180, 182 (2007).
b. In enacting the Affordable Care Act in general,
and the minimum coverage provision in particular, Con-
gress recognized that it confronted a market that differs
in significant respects from all others. 
First, participation in the market for health care is
essentially universal, and an individual’s need for expen-
sive medical care is unpredictable.  Nearly everyone will
require health care services at some point in his or her
life, and “[m]ost medical expenses for people under 65”
result “from the ‘bolt-from-the-blue’ event of an acci-
dent, a stroke, or a complication of pregnancy that we
know will happen on average but whose victim we cannot
(and they cannot) predict well in advance.”  Expanding
Consumer Choice and Addressing “Adverse Selection”
Concerns in Health Insurance:  Hearings Before the
Joint Econ. Comm., 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (2004)
(statement of Mark V. Pauly, Univ. of Pennsylvania).
Costs can mount rapidly for treatment of even the most
common significant health problems.3  It is difficult for
all, and impossible for many, to budget for such contin-
gencies.
Second, because of the virtually inevitable, yet un-
predictable, need for health care services, individuals
typically pay for them through insurance.  In 2009, pay-
ments by private health insurers constituted 32% of na-
7tional health care spending.  National Health Expendi-
tures Data, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
table 3 (2011), http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealth
ExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf.  More than 43% of
total health care expenditures was financed by federal,
state, and local governments, including through insur-
ance programs such as Medicare, the federal program
that provides health insurance for elderly and certain
disabled Americans, as well as Medicaid.  Id. tables 5,
11. 
Third, many individuals receive, and expect to re-
ceive, costly health care services in times of need with-
out regard to their ability to pay for the services.  For 25
years, the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labor Act (EMTALA) has required hospitals that par-
ticipate in Medicare and offer emergency services to
stabilize any patient who arrives with an emergency
condition, regardless of whether the person has insur-
ance or otherwise can pay.  42 U.S.C. 1395dd; see Rob-
erts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 250-251 (1999)
(per curiam).  Even before enactment of EMTALA,
many state legislatures and courts had concluded that
hospitals cannot properly turn away people in need of
emergency treatment.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 241, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 3, at 5 (1985) (in addition to “state
court rulings impos[ing] a common law duty on doctors
and hospitals to provide necessary emergency care,” by
1985, “at least 22 states [had] enacted statutes or issued
regulations requiring the provision of limited medical
services whenever an emergency situation exists”).  The
federal Medicare and Medicaid programs provide sub-
stantial support for hospitals that incur such uncompen-
sated costs through additional payments for “dispropor-
tionate share hospitals,” and many States have addi-
8tional programs to support hospitals with significant
amounts of uncompensated care.
Against the backdrop of these unique and fundamen-
tal features of the market for health care services, Con-
gress made specific statutory findings addressing the
basis for exercising its powers under Article I of the
Constitution.  For example, it found that the minimum
coverage provision “regulates activity that is commercial
and economic in nature:  economic and financial deci-
sions about how and when health care is paid for, and
when health insurance is purchased.”  §§ 1501(a)(2)(A),
10106(a), 124 Stat. 243, 907 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
18091(a)(2)(A)).  Congress concluded that “[i]n the
absence of the requirement, some individuals would
make an economic and financial decision to forego health
insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure, which
increases financial risks to households and medical
providers.”  § 10106(a), 124 Stat. 907 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. 18091(a)(2)(A)).  Congress found that
the provision will reduce the substantial cost-shifting
in the interstate health care market that results from
the practice of consuming health care without insurance
and that increases the premiums of insured consumers.
§ 10106(a), 124 Stat. 908 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
18091(a)(2)(F )).
In addition, Congress found that the minimum cover-
age provision is key to the viability of the Act’s require-
ment that insurers provide coverage and charge premi-
ums without regard to a person’s medical condition or
history.  Without a minimum coverage requirement,
“many individuals would wait to purchase health insur-
ance until they needed care,” which would undermine
the effectiveness of insurance markets.  §§ 1501(a)(2)(G),
10106(a), 124 Stat. 243, 908 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
918091(a)(2)(I)); see, e.g., 47 Million and Counting:  Why
the Health Care Marketplace is Broken, Hearings Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong., 2d Sess. 52
(2008) (statement of Mark A. Hall, Wake Forest Univ.)
(a “health insurance market could never survive or even
form if people could buy their insurance on the way to
the hospital”).
2. On March 10, 2010—13 days before enactment of
the Affordable Care Act—the Virginia General Assem-
bly passed a statute providing that “[n]o resident of this
Commonwealth  *  *  *  shall be required to obtain or
maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage ex-
cept as required by a court or the Department of Social
Services where an individual is named a party in a judi-
cial or administrative proceeding.”  Va. Code Ann.
§ 38.2-3430.1:1 (Supp. 2010).  The day the Affordable
Care Act was signed into law, petitioner filed suit
against respondent, asking the district court to “declare
that § 38.2-3430.1:1 is a valid exercise of state power”
because the minimum coverage provision was enacted
in excess of Congress’s enumerated powers.  Compl. 6
(prayer for relief ).
Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of standing
because the minimum coverage provision applies only to
individuals, not States like petitioner, and a State does
not have parens patriae standing to assert the interests
of its citizens in a suit against the United States.  Pet.
App. 58-59 (citing, inter alia, Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923)).  The district court denied the mo-
tion to dismiss.  Id. at 54-89.  The court acknowledged
that Virginia’s statute was merely “declaratory,” but
held that petitioner could nonetheless sue the United
States “to defend the [statute] from the conflicting effect
of an allegedly unconstitutional federal law.”  Id. at 66.
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On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court held that the minimum coverage provision is not a
valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause or its power to lay and collect taxes.  Pet. App. 1-
46.  In addressing the commerce power, the court did
not question Congress’s finding that consumption of
health care services without insurance imposes a sub-
stantial burden on the interstate health care mar-
ket.  § 10106(a), 124 Stat. 908 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
18091(a)(2)(F)).  Nor did the court question Congress’s
finding that the minimum coverage provision is instru-
mental to the Act’s provisions that bar insurance compa-
nies from denying coverage because of pre-existing med-
ical conditions.  §§ 1501(a)(2)(G), 10106(a), 124 Stat. 243,
908 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 18091(a)(2)(I)).  The dis-
trict court nonetheless concluded that Congress has au-
thority under the Commerce Clause to regulate only
“self-initiated action” and that regulation of the means
of payment for health care services does not fall into
that category.  Pet. App. 28-29.  The court reasoned that
defining economic activity to include regulation of how
people pay for health care, including people who decline
to purchase insurance, “lacks logical limitation and is
unsupported by Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”  Id.
at 29.
Addressing Congress’s taxing power, the court rec-
ognized that the minimum coverage provision amends
the Internal Revenue Code to provide that non-
exempted individuals who fail to maintain minimum cov-
erage shall pay a penalty, which is calculated in part by
reference to household income, is reported on the individ-
ual’s federal income tax return for the taxable year, and
is assessed and collected in the same manner as certain
other federal tax penalties.  Pet. App. 32-33.  The court
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also acknowledged that the Congressional Budget Office
projected that this provision will generate billions of
dollars of revenue each year that will be paid into the
general treasury.  Id. at 32.  Nonetheless, the court held
that the provision is not a valid exercise of Congress’s
taxing power because, in the court’s view, the “legisla-
tive purpose underlying this provision was purely regu-
lation of what Congress misperceived to be economic
activity.”  Id. at 40.
The district court issued a declaratory judgment that
the minimum coverage provision is unconstitutional.
Pet. App. 52.  The court determined that the minimum
coverage provision and “directly-dependent provisions
which make specific reference” to it are severable from
the remainder of the Affordable Care Act, id. at 49, and
denied injunctive relief, id. at 49-50.
3. Both parties appealed, jointly moved for expe-
dited briefing and argument, and asked that the case be
heard by the Fourth Circuit on the same day as Liberty
University v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, in which a different
district court upheld the constitutionality of the mini-
mum coverage provision against challenge by several
uninsured individuals and a non-profit organization.  See
Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010
WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010).  The Fourth Cir-
cuit granted that joint motion and a parallel motion filed
in Liberty University, and it has scheduled argument in
both appeals for May 10.
ARGUMENT
The parties are currently briefing this case in the
court of appeals on an expedited basis.  The opening
brief for the Secretary of Health and Human Services
has already been filed in that court (along with 19 amici
12
briefs), and oral argument is scheduled to be held in ap-
proximately 60 days.  Especially given the court of ap-
peals’ imminent consideration of this case, there is no
basis for short-circuiting the normal course of appellate
review by granting a writ of certiorari before judgment.
Moreover, this case would make a poor vehicle to ad-
dress the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s
minimum coverage provision because petitioner’s claim
to standing rests entirely on a novel “declaratory” state
statute (Pet. App. 66), and that threshold jurisdictional
question could readily prevent the Court from reaching
the merits of petitioner’s claim.  The petition should be
denied.
1. Rule 11 of the Rules of this Court provides that a
petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment “will be
granted only upon a showing that the case is of such im-
perative public importance as to justify deviation from
normal appellate practice and to require immediate de-
termination in this Court.”  The constitutionality of the
minimum coverage provision is undoubtedly an issue of
great public importance.  This case is not, however, one
of the rare cases that justifies “deviation from normal
appellate practice” and “require[s] immediate determi-
nation in this Court.”  Sup. Ct. R. 11.
The constitutionality of the minimum coverage provi-
sion is already under expedited review in three courts of
appeals, and expedition has been sought in a fourth.  The
Fourth Circuit will hold argument in this case and in
Liberty University v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, on May 10.
The Sixth Circuit will hear oral argument in Thomas
More Law Center v. Obama, No. 10-2388, during its
May 30-June 10 sitting.  That case presents an appeal
from the decision in Thomas More Law Center v.
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010), which,
13
4 In Bondi, the district court held that the minimum coverage pro-
vision was in excess of Congress’s enumerated powers and that it was
inseverable from the rest of the Act.  See 2011 WL 285683 at *20-*39.
On that basis, the court “declared void” the “entire Act.”  Id. at *40.
The court subsequently stayed its decision pending appellate review.
See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 723117, at *8-*11 (N.D. Fla.
Mar. 3, 2011). 
like Liberty University, rejected constitutional chal-
lenges to the minimum coverage provision.  In Seven-
Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047 (D.C. Cir.), the United States
has consented to appellants’ request for expedited brief-
ing.  That case involves an appeal from the decision in
Mead v. Holder, No. Civ.A. 10-950 GK, 2011 WL 611139
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011), which likewise rejected constitu-
tional challenges to the minimum coverage provision.
Like Liberty University, the Thomas More Law Center
and Seven-Sky cases involve uninsured individual plain-
tiffs who will be subject to the minimum coverage provi-
sion and whose standing the government does not chal-
lenge.  In addition, the government has appealed the
district court’s decision in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Uni-
ted States Department of Health & Human Services,
No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla.
Jan. 31, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-11021 (11th Cir.
Mar. 9, 2011), cross-appeal docketed, No. 11-11067 (11th
Cir. Mar. 11, 2011).4  The Eleventh Circuit has expedited
proceedings, and the case will be fully briefed on May
25.
Petitioner identifies no persuasive reason for this
Court to proceed without the benefit of review by the
courts of appeals.  Cf. United States v. Mendoza, 464
U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (Court “benefit[s]” from allowing
circuit courts to consider a question “before this Court
14
grants certiorari.”).  The minimum coverage provision is
the only provision of the Affordable Care Act that peti-
tioner claims is unconstitutional, and it does not take
effect until 2014, i.e., for more than two-and-one-half
years.  Moreover, no court has precluded the govern-
ment from preparing to implement the Affordable Care
Act under the schedule Congress established.  There
will be ample time before 2014 for this Court to decide
whether to grant review in the normal course and, if it
does so, to issue a decision.
Indeed, because petitioner has not sought expedition
of its request for certiorari before judgment, even were
its petition granted, this case would not be heard until
next Term.  Given the pendency of expedited appeals in
three courts of appeals (and a pending request for expe-
dition in a fourth), see pp. 12-13, supra, it is possible
that one of those cases could be heard next Term in the
normal course.  See Liberty Univ. Amicus Br. 5-6 (not-
ing that the Fourth Circuit is among the fastest courts
of appeals).  Accordingly, granting certiorari before
judgment in this case would not necessarily result in
significantly accelerating this Court’s review of the con-
stitutionality of the minimum coverage provision.  At the
same time, it would have the certain downside of depriv-
ing this Court of consideration of these issues by the
court of appeals.
2. Petitioner contends that this Court’s review is
warranted even before the courts of appeals have had
the opportunity to address the constitutionality of the
minimum coverage provision because petitioner must
“devote considerable resources now to meet the require-
ments of ” other provisions of the Affordable Care Act.
Pet. 14; see Pet. at 14-16 (discussing alleged present
burdens caused by several provisions of the Act other
15
5 Petitioner contends that those provisions already in effect, while
not unconstitutional, are inseverable from the one provision it has chal-
lenged.  The district court properly declined to declare those provisions
inseverable.  Pet. App. 46-49; see Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Ac-
counting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010) (“Generally speak-
ing, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit
the solution to the problem, severing any problematic portions while
leaving the remainder intact.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).  In any event, petitioner’s sweeping contention (Pet. i) that
Congress would not have wanted any portion of the Affordable Care
Act to remain effective in the event that the minimum coverage provi-
sion were invalidated (including even those provisions “patently extran-
eous to health care,” Pet. App. 46) is most clearly wrong with respect
to provisions, like those already in effect, that Congress required to be-
come operative before 2014, i.e., years before the minimum coverage
provision takes effect. 
than the minimum coverage provision).  Petitioner has
not claimed that any of these provisions exceed Con-
gress’s constitutional authority, and the district court
did not specifically consider, let alone invalidate, them.5
That petitioner must remain subject to those unchal-
lenged provisions during the relatively short time neces-
sary for orderly appellate review thus does not consti-
tute an extraordinary circumstance warranting certio-
rari before judgment.
In any event, the petition provides no examples of
substantial resources currently devoted to compliance
with the Affordable Care Act.  For example, petitioner
states that it must “assess” whether to exercise the op-
tion of developing a health insurance exchange under
the Act, which would otherwise be established by the
federal government.  Pet. 14.  Petitioner also cites “com-
plex bills” that were pending before the Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly.  Ibid.  Those bills, which have since been
approved by the General Assembly, do not appear to
16
6 See Department of Planning & Budget, 2011 Fiscal Impact State-
ment, HB 2434, Va. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Info. Sys., 1 (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?111+oth+HB2434F122+
PDF.
7 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Exchange Planning Grants:
Grant Awards List, HealthCare.gov (July 29, 2010), http://www.
healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/grantawardslist.html; News Release,
Forty-eight states receive new resources to build competitive health
insurance marketplaces, HHS.gov (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.
hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/09/20100930b.html. 
8 News Release, HHS Announces new resources to help states im-
plement Affordable Care Act, HHS.gov (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.hhs.
gov/news/press/2011pres/01/20110120b.html.
9 See State Corp. Comm’n, 2011 Fiscal Impact Statement, HB 1928,
Va. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Info. Sys., 1 (Feb. 22, 2011), http://leg1.
state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?111+oth+HB1928FER171+PDF;
State Corp. Comm’n, 2011 Fiscal Impact Statement, HB 1958, Va. Gen.
involve a significant expenditure of resources.  For ex-
ample, the fiscal impact statement accompanying H.B.
2434, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011), which de-
clares Virginia’s intent to establish a health insurance
exchange, “specifies no fiscal impact” and states that
“[i]t is feasible that the state may be able to design and
implement an exchange with available federal grants
and no state funding.” 6  Notably, petitioner has already
received a federal grant for exchange planning,7 and it
is currently eligible to apply for a federal grant to estab-
lish an exchange.8  The fiscal impact statements accom-
panying H.B. 1928, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011),
which requires insurers to accord policyholders certain
appeal rights, and H.B. 1958, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Va. 2011), which requires insurers to adhere to other
federal requirements, report that those measures also
have no fiscal impact.9
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Assemb. Legis. Info. Sys., 1 (Feb. 25, 2011), http://leg1.state.va.us/
cgi-bin/legp504.exe?111+oth+HB1958FER171+PDF. 
3. This case does not resemble the handful of cases
in which this Court has taken the extraordinary step of
granting certiorari before judgment.  See Pet. 16-17, 18
(citing cases).  The Court did not grant certiorari before
judgment in those cases because the issues they pre-
sented “must be and will be decided in this Court,” Pet.
16, but instead because of extraordinary circumstances,
not present here, warranting this Court’s immediate
intervention outside the normal course of appellate re-
view.  In most of the cases petitioner cites, this Court
granted early review because allowing review to proceed
in the normal course presented risks of extraordinary
disruption and irreparable harm.
For example, in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361 (1989), the Court granted petitions for certiorari
before judgment filed by both the United States and a
criminal defendant to decide the constitutionality of the
federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. at 371.  At the time
of the government’s petition in that case, 50 different
district courts had decided the question (dividing 29-21),
and further delay in final resolution of the question
would have required that thousands of criminal defen-
dants be resentenced.  Pet. at 9-11, 14, Mistretta, supra
(No. 87-1904).  Likewise, the United States filed a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari before judgment in United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947),
because, absent immediate resolution by this Court, an
ongoing strike at the nation’s bituminous coal mines
(then being operated by the United States) threatened
“a decline in total employment of at least 5,000,000 full
time workers” and a decline in annual national income of
18
10 See St. Louis, Kan. City & Colo. R.R. v. Wabash R.R., 217 U.S. 247,
249, 251 (1910) (certiorari before judgment granted where “question in-
volve[d] the construction of a prior decree of a United States Circuit
Court, affirmed by this court”); see also James Lindgren & William P.
Marshall, The Supreme Court’s Extraordinary Power to Grant Cer-
tiorari Before Judgment in the Court of Appeals, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev.
259, 270 (explaining grant of certiorari in St. Louis Railroad on that
basis). 
$20 billion.  Pet. at 21, United Mine Workers, supra
(Nos. 46-759, 46-760).  The United States petitioned for
a writ of certiorari before judgment (and acquiesced in
a petition filed by a private party) in Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), because a number of dis-
trict courts had enjoined collection of federal taxes un-
der the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, 15
U.S.C. 801 et seq.  See U.S. Mem. at 2, Carter Coal, su-
pra (No. 35-636); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 584 (1952) (Court granted peti-
tions for certiorari before judgment filed by the United
States and a private party to review legality of federal
government’s ongoing seizure of the nation’s steel indus-
try); Pet. at 6, 7, Railroad Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295
U.S. 330 (1935) (No. 34-566) (United States sought cer-
tiorari before judgment because district court had en-
joined operation of federal statute “which directly
affect[ed] over 1,000,000 employees and all interstate
commerce carriers by railway”).
Other examples cited by petitioner were cases in
which the Court granted certiorari before judgment ei-
ther because the case had previously been before it at an
earlier stage of the proceedings10 or because the Court
had already granted review (in the normal course) in
19
11 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 259-260 (2003) (Court granted
certiorari before judgment because addition of second case to one al-
ready pending would permit Court to “address the constitutionality of
the consideration of race in university admissions in a wider range of
circumstances”); New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 418 (1970)
(certiorari before judgment granted because Court had noted probable
jurisdiction under its appellate jurisdiction in closely related case);
Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252, 254 (1946) (certiorari before judgment
granted because of “the close relationship of the important question
raised to the question presented in” another case in which certiorari
had been granted in the normal course); United States v. Bankers Trust
Co., 294 U.S. 240, 243 (1935) (Court granted United States’ petition for
certiorari before judgment where another case presenting same issue
was already pending before the Court); see U.S. Pet. at 4, Bankers
Trust Co., supra (Nos. 34-471, 34-472).
another case presenting the same or a similar issue.11
Neither of those circumstances is presented here.
4. Even assuming arguendo that the standards for
certiorari before judgment were otherwise satisfied in
this case, this petition should be denied because of a
threshold standing question that could readily prevent
the Court from reaching the merits.
Virginia has claimed that only one provision of the
Affordable Care Act is unconstitutional:  the minimum
coverage provision.  That provision applies only to indi-
viduals and imposes no duties on Virginia or other
States.  Insofar as Virginia asserts any cognizable
rights, they are the purported rights of its residents not
to be subject to the minimum coverage provision.  This
Court’s precedents, however, foreclose a suit by a State
against the federal government “to protect her citizens
from the operation of federal statutes.”  Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007); see also Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16
(1982) (“[a] State does not have standing as parens
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patriae to bring an action against the Federal Govern-
ment”) (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,
485-486 (1923), and Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208,
241 (1901)).
Petitioner attempts to circumvent this longstanding
limitation on state standing to sue the United States by
relying on Virginia Code Annotated § 38.2-3430.1:1
(Supp. 2010), which was enacted shortly before the Af-
fordable Care Act was signed into law.  That state stat-
ute declares that no Virginia resident “shall be required
to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance
coverage except as required by a court or the [Virginia]
Department of Social Services.”  Ibid.  It grants the
Commonwealth and its Attorney General no power of
enforcement, and petitioner has not suggested that the
statute serves any function other than as an effort to
create standing in this case that petitioner indisputably
would otherwise lack.  Indeed, the statute exempts enti-
ties other than the federal government, allowing a high-
er education institution, for example, to require health
insurance as a condition of enrollment.  Ibid.
Nonetheless, the district court, while acknowledging
that the state statute is wholly “declaratory,” reasoned
that petitioner may bring this suit “to defend the Vir-
ginia Health Care Freedom Act from the conflicting ef-
fect of an allegedly unconstitutional federal law.”  Pet.
App. 66.  Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, how-
ever, petitioner cannot avoid the bar to a State’s stand-
ing to assert the rights of its citizens in a suit against the
United States by enacting a statute that codifies its legal
claim.  Regardless of whether petitioner’s disagreement
with federal law is framed in a complaint or proclaimed
in a legislative declaration, its suit impermissibly calls
upon the courts “to adjudicate, not rights of person or
21
property, not rights of dominion over physical domain,
not quasi-sovereign rights actually invaded or threat-
ened, but abstract questions of political power, of sover-
eignty, of government.”  Mellon, 262 U.S. at 484-485; see
also New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 337 (1926) (al-
legation that provisions of federal law “go beyond the
power of Congress and impinge on that of the State
*  *  *  do not suffice as a basis for invoking an exercise
of judicial power”).
Comparison with cases in which this Court has found
state standing in actions against the federal government
demonstrates that this case is not justiciable.  For exam-
ple, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that the
State could challenge EPA’s failure to regulate green-
house gas emissions because “rising seas,” caused in
part by these emissions, would injure Massachusetts “in
its capacity as a landowner” and “have already begun to
swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land.”  549 U.S. at 522-
523.  A State likewise may challenge a measure that
commands the State itself to take action, e.g., New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (federal law re-
quired state to take title to nuclear waste or enact feder-
ally approved regulations), or that prohibits specified
state action, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
(federal law prohibited States from using literacy tests
or durational residency requirements in elections). 
This case challenging the minimum coverage provi-
sion has none of those features, and a State cannot con-
vert a “naked contention that Congress has usurped the
reserved powers of the several States,” Mellon, 262 U.S.
at 483, into a justiciable controversy by passing a statute
that declares federal law unenforceable against the citi-
zens of that State.  This Court stressed in Massachu-
setts v. EPA that “there is a critical difference between
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allowing a State ‘to protect her citizens from the opera-
tion of federal statutes’ (which is what Mellon prohibits)
and allowing a State to assert its rights under federal
law (which it has standing to do).”  549 U.S. at 520 n.17
(quoting Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439,
447 (1945)); see id. at 547 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(States do not have standing to pursue “symbolic” litiga-
tion because “[t]he constitutional role of the courts
*  *  *  is to decide concrete cases—not to serve as a con-
venient forum for policy debates”).  The only objective
of the Virginia statute is “to protect her citizens from
the operation of federal statutes.”  Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17.  This Court’s precedents thus
foreclose petitioner’s invitation to adjudicate the “an-
tagonistic assertions of right,” Compl. ¶ 4, that are the
sole basis for this suit.
Respondent has challenged petitioner’s standing on
these grounds before the court of appeals, see Gov’t C.A.
Br. 24-30, and this Court would benefit from having that
court’s considered views on the standing question before
deciding whether to grant review in this case.
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CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment
should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
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